It was contended in the work, for example, of Machlup (I 949) and Greenhut (I 956) that basing-point pricing encourages concentrated production at or near the base point while discouraging entry at distant sites. Empirical support for this view derived from the work of Wilcox (I963) who noted that the growth of the Southern and Western United States was retarded by the Pittsburgh plus basing-point system in steel (p. 284). This contention was further" supported by the relatively rapid expansion of steel production capacity in the South and West, in Detroit and Cleveland and along the Eastern seaboard after basingpoint pricing was abandoned in July, I948 This paper concentrates upon these locational issues, particularly in their effects on a new entrant. Specifically, a spatial model is developed which allows us to analyse the location choice of an entrant when that entrant either accepts the ruling basing-point pricing system or enters in price competition with the incumbent firms. The model sheds more analytic light on the claim noted above that basing-point pricing encourages more localisation of production than would otherwise occur. The specific conditions under which this claim is justified are identified but it is also shown that there will be cases in which basing-point pricing and competitive entrants will adopt identical locations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section I outlines the spatial model upon which the analysis is based. Price equilibrium under basing-point and competitive entry are analysed in Section II. Location choice for the two types of entrant is computed in Section III and Section IV compares location choice under competitive and basing-point entry for different values of the relevant parameters. The main conclusions are summarised in Section V.
THE MODEL
A very simple spatial model is used that is now familiar in the literature. The market area is assumed to be a bounded line, denoted by the interval [o, Z], over which identical consumers are uniformly distributed at unit density. Two types of firms are assumed to exist in the market:
(i) A set B of firms that are coincidentally located at the single basing-point. B contains n > 2 firms. Without loss of generality we assume that the basingpoint is the left-hand extremity of the market;
(ii) A potential entrant firm that is assumed to locate at some distance x to the right of the basing point, where x is a decision variable. The potential entrant is denoted by subscript x.1 Both types of firm produce a homogeneous product. Individual demand for this product is assumed linear in delivered price and given for a consumer located at s by the normalised demand function:
q(s) = i-p(s) (sE[,Z]) (I )
where q(s) is quantity demanded and p(s) delivered price at s. The linear assumption eases computation but, as is well known from spatial price theory, Greenhut et al. (I987), can be taken as representative of a wide range of concave, or 'not too convex' demand forms.
Consumers buy from the firm offering the product at the lowest price. If the entrant chooses to follow the basing-point price throughout a market segment then demand in this area will be shared equally between the entrant and the basingpoint firms. This is in the spirit of the historical justifications advanced in favour of basing-point pricing: it was (and is) claimed that basing-point pricing facilitates interpenetration of markets.
With competitive entry there may also be points where delivered prices from the basing-point and x are the same. Assume that price competition is Bertrand-at-every-point, at least for the entrant. So long as the basing-point firms' delivered price is greater than the entrant's costs at a particular market point, the entrant can undercut the basing-point firms and win that market. This is sometimes referred to as the c-argument: the low-cost firm can undercut its competitor by c, where c is 'small'. It is assumed, therefore, that the lefthand boundary of the competitive entrant's market area is the market point at which the entrant's marginal production and transport costs just equal the basing-point firms' delivered price. This does not mean that the basing-point firms are necessarily passive actors in the competitive game with the entrant. Indeed, one of the issues to be considered below is the 'best' choice of price for the basing-point firms given that they anticipate the entry of a price-competing firm.
Production is assumed to be characterised by constant marginal costs which are normalised to zero at the basing-point. Locations distant from the basingpoint suffer a production cost penalty: perhaps because the basing-point enjoys favourable access to production inputs. The cost penalty is assumed linear in distance and output. Thus marginal production costs at location x are given Kx(K > o). Note that the assumptions regarding the linearity of the market and the end-point location of the basing point allow reference to be made interchangeably to ' location x' and ' the firm (or consumer) distance x from the basing point'.
Transport is assumed linear in distance and quantity,2 and given by t per to a collusive basing-point system. There remain, of course, interesting strategic issues with respect to ' central' as opposed to ' peripheral' entry, but these are outside the scope of this paper. Reason (ii) also raises some interesting questions. Certainly, it would be possible to model multiple entry as a sequential process; see, for example, Prescott and Visscher (1977) and subsequent extensions. The qualitative conclusions on the location choice of a single entrant will, however, be essentially unaffected if the analysis is extended to allow for multiple entry. In other words, the additional insights that might come from allowing for multiple entry do not justify the increased analytic intractability such a generalisation necessitates. 2 Nonlinear transport costs in distance could be considered but this severely complicates the analysis without affecting the qualitative conclusions. 
k > I implies production costs at any non-base site exceed production costs at the base point plus transportation costs from the base point.
II. PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
In identifying price equilibrium in this spatial model, ?assume that the locations of the basing-point firms are fixed.
I. The Incumbent B-firms
Although the incumbent firms are assumed to collude on pricing policy -they adopt basing-point pricing which is, by definition, f.o.b. -there may still be competition between them on the actual base-point price: of course, in equilibrium all active B-firms will charge identical delivered prices. It appears, therefore, that price competition among the B-firms should be modelled as a repeated game. This is a complicated exercise much of the essence of which can be captured by parameterising price competition among the incumbents.4 Given our demand structure, this is equivalent to assuming that the B-firms charge a mill price ac, where: (i) a = o is equivalent to unrestricted price competition: the incumbents act as Bertrand competitors with marginal cost pricing the only Bertrand equilibrium for two or more B-type firms;
(ii) cx = a* is equivalent to perfect collusion between the incumbents: where o* remains to be determined (see below); (iii) o < a < c* can then be interpreted as being equivalent to different degrees of collusion between the incumbents.
The approach implicit in (iii) allows analysis of the impact on the entrant's location of different degrees of collusion among the incumbents: in essence, ac is taken as exogenous. The perfect collusion case (ii) should be treated 3 This implies, of course, that the entrant is constrained to supply only customers in [o, Z] perhaps because it is constrained to operate within a particular basing-point area. In the formal analysis, the effect on location choice of imposing different limits on the market area is considered. ' We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the following argument. It is consistent with the Folk Theorem which suggests that many equilibria are possible in repeated price games: Friedman (I97I); Tirole (I989).
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POINT PRICING 543 somewhat differently. This case is equivalent to x being determined endogenously. The price charged by the incumbents will affect the location of the entrant and this will affect the post-entry profit of the incumbents. With perfect collusion between the incumbents there is an optimal price they should charge which need not -and with competitive entry typically.will not -be the monopoly price. The optimal base-point price c* is likely to be affected by: (i) the number of incumbents; (ii) the cost penalty incurred by the entrants; and (iii) the pricing policy adopted by the entrant.
II.2. A Competitive Entrant
The potential competitive entrant in choosing whether to enter the market and the location at which it will enter anticipates the price equilibrium that will apply post-entry. (5) respectively. The first term is profit in the market area Zx -Zxf, in which price is determined by delivered price from the basing-point, while the second term is profit in the market area Z' in which the entrant has a monopoly position. Given the assumed demand and cost conditions, the profit function (I 3) is a cubic in tx. The first order condition is a quadratic, the appropriate form of which depends on whether x is less than or greater than v, i.e. whether the optimal location is described by Fig. I (a) or (b) (recall equation (5)). We can write this quadratic in the form: (ii) x* < v < Z: this is the case illustrated in Fig. I (a) and assumes that the interval Z' is non-empty. In other words, this case assumes that the entrant can charge the monopoly discriminatory price to some set of consumers. From equation ( If ac is endogenous, then the optimal choice of ac, as indicated above, is likely to be affected by the number of incumbents. There will, therefore, be an interaction between the number of incumbents and the entrant's location choice.
IV. I. aC Exogenous
Location choice by a basing-point and competitive entrant are compared in Tables I and 2 The existence of such a sub-set of consumers is more likely the more extensive the market (the greater is Z), the lower the cost penalty (k) incurred by the entrant, and the higher the price (a) charged by the incumbent basing-point firms: in our interpretation of a made here, the greater the degree of collusion between the incumbent basing-point firms.
Machlup's conclusion that basing-point pricing leads to greater production concentration must, therefore, be qualified. This conclusion is much more likely to hold true in extensive market areas, where the incumbent firms hold off to at least some extent from price competition between themselves and where these firms enjoy no great production cost advantage with respect to new entrants.
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IV.2. a Endogenous
The discussion of section IV. I assumes that the incumbent basing-point firms adopt the same base-point price no matter the pricing policy of the entrant. It is difficult to maintain such an assumption once perfect collusion between the incumbents is allowed. There is a relationship between the incumbent firms' post-entry profit and the base-point price they adopt. This relationship identifies an optimal base-point price, x, that perfectly colluding incumbents should adopt. Recall that the entrant chooses the optimal location given the price level charged by the incumbents. Thus, the optimal base-point price * is identified on the assumption that the incumbents do not attempt to deter entry but do correctly anticipate the location the entrant will choose. Effectively, the incumbents are acting as leaders of a Stackelberg game.
Basing-Point-Pricing Entry
A complication arises if the entrant adopts basing-point pricing since the incumbents' profit/base price relationship can have two maxima. From our discussion in section IV.i, an increase in the base-point price induces the entrant to locate nearer to the base-point. But this implies that the left-hand boundary (z) of the entrant's market area will approach the basing-point, i.e. z will tend to zero. From equation ( The first term is the (positive) price effect. It is smaller the more extensive is the market area and/or the nearer the basing-point price approaches to the monopoly price: see equation (26) . The second term is the (negative) market area effect and is greater in absolute magnitude the smaller is the number of incumbent basing-point firms. This can be put another way. Assume that the incumbents anticipate the entrant will follow the basing-point pricing scheme. Then perfect collusion among the incumbents is more likely to lead to the optimal basing-point price being the monopoly price of equation (26) Table 4 identifies the optimal, perfectly collusive basing-point price with competitive entry. The optimal basing-point price is lower:
I. the greater the cost penalty incurred by the entrant; II. the more constrained is the market area. Table 4 also provides for comparison the perfectly collusive basing-point price with basing point entry. In comparing the optimal basing-point price for different pricing policies of the entrant, assume initially that condition (28) is satisfied and, in addition, that the internal maximum is a global maximum. Then conditions I and II above also characterise the optimal basing-point price in the event of basing-point entry. There is, in addition, a third condition: III. with basing-point entry, if there is an internal equilibrium the optimal basing-point price will be lower the fewer incumbents there are.
Comparison of Optimal Collusive Prices
If condition (28) is not satisfied, equation (26) gives the optimal basing-point price for the incumbents in the event of basing point entry. In this event only condition II characterises the optimal basing point price (see Table 4 ).
Whether or not condition (28) holds, the incumbents' optimal basing point THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY price is always higher with basing point than with competitive entry, a conclusion that should not be surprising given the market sharing arrangements that characterise the former type of entry. Some comments are, perhaps, in order as to why the number of incumbents may affect the optimal incumbent price with basing-point entry but not with competitive entry. Consider first competitive entry. The entrant takes all demand in its market area and the best the incumbents can do is choose ac to maximise aggregate post-entry profits in their remaining market area. The resulting optimal value of a will be independent of the number of incumbents. By contrast, basing-point entry allows the incumbents to share demand with the entrant in the entrant's market area. Profit to each incumbent is then an (n+ i ) th share of profit in the entrant's market area and an nth share of the remaining market area. Aggregate profit to the incumbents is no longer independent of the number of incumbents. Hence, the optimal incumbent price (cx*) will be some function of the number of incumbents: provided always, of course, that this is not the monopoly price with basing-point entry.
Conditions I, II and III may appear to be counter-intuitive. I and II arise because an increase in the cost penalty incurred by entrants, or a reduction in the overall market area, will encourage the entrant to locate nearer to the incumbents for any given incumbent price level. This reduces the monopoly market area of the incumbents, and so encourages them to lower the base-point price in order fo maintain sales and profitability, and in order to limit market penetration by the entrant.
So far as III is concerned, recall that the assumption that cc is endogenous is equivalent to perfect collusion on the part of the incumbents. The greater the number of incumbents the less will be the impact of a basing-point entrant on their aggregate profitability: the entrant takes an (n + i) th share of demand in its market area. As a result, the greater the number of incumbents the nearer will the collusive, post-entry price approach the monopoly price.
Relative Location Choice Now consider relative location choice with different types of entry. When ax is endogenous, it is unlikely that basing-point pricing and competitive pricing will ever give rise to the same location choice by the entrant. The optimal price, cx*, charged by the perfectly collusive basing point firms is determined by the pricing policy of the entrant and, with basing-point entry, the number of incumbents. As we have seen, the expectation of basing point gives rise to a higher basing point price than will the expectation of competitive entry. This difference in basing-point price is sufficient to ensure that the expectation of competitive entry will lead to greater decentralisation of production than will expected basing-point entry. The degree of decentralisation of production decreases the lower the cost penalty of location choice distant from the basingpoint and the less constrained is the market area. Nevertheless, even if the market area is sufficiently constrained to eliminate any monopoly pricing advantage for the entrant, there will still be a difference in location choice resulting from the pricing policy of the entrant. In other words, the traditional I99I]
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The contention that basing-point pricing encourages productibn concentration has long been part of received wisdom. What has not been appreciated are the precise conditions under which this received wisdom is, indeed, correct. It has been shown in this paper that two conditions are sufficient. First, if there is imperfect collusion among basing-point firms, a basing-point entrant will locate nearer to the basing-point than a competitive entrant only if the competitive entrant has a monopoly pricing advantage with respect to a non-empty sub-set of the consumer market. The existence of such a sub-set of consumers is more likely in extensive market areas in which the incumbent firms enjoy no great production cost advantage with respect to new entrants and in which the incumbent firms hold off to at least some extent from price competition between themselves.
In the event of perfect price collusion among the incumbent basing-point firms, the expectation of basing-point entry will lead to a higher base-point price than will the expectation of competitive entry. Even if the market area is sufficiently small as to eliminate any monopoly pricing advantage for a competitive entrant, there will be a difference in location choice resulting from the anticipated pricing policy of the entrant. In other words, perfect collusion among the incumbent base-point firms is sufficient to generate concentrated production.
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